The European
Court of
Human Rights was established
in principle as the main instrument
for implementing a particular Convention and protector of human rights. This Court has spoken out against Italy with
a very brief statement of basis at the request of two residents in
this State: Rosetta Costa and M. Walter Pavan. Both
were carriers of a genetic disease and both wanted
access to a medically assisted procreation in
order to prevent the transmission
of a genetic disease by preimplantation embryo selection.
The Italian law 40, known as
Assisted Reproduction Law, prohibits
eugenic practices, in particular embryo selection.
The European Court of Human Rights noticed a
contradiction between the law 40
and Law 194 which allows therapeutic
abortion. In fact the couple had
previously agreed to an abortion based on
this justification. They did so after the fetus being
diagnosed the disease through
prenatal diagnosis, currently the most widespread instrument
to prevent birth (in fact, an euphemism
to kill handicapped). The Court Based his judgement on the contradiction
found in the italian legislation. This
contradiction was
a violation
of Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms which states
that everyone has the right to
protection of privacy and family. It seems
that in principle this article has nothing to do strictly with the application of
limits on embryo selection in IVF, and in fact the
Court had ruled so,
considering that the prohibition of
heterologous fertilization called
by Austria did
not limit the personal or family life. Indeed at that time still
the Grand Chamber accepted that the interference of Article 8 does not refer exclusively to a negative duty of the State but also implies a
positive duty to promote that
life, insisting that the aim
is not to replace the Court margin own appreciation
of States in the legislation of assisted fertilization.
I will read a few paragraphs that
seem to be relevant and have not been taken into consideration in Judgment Costa & Pavan:
“The
Court reiterates that a number of factors must be taken into account when
determining the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the
State when deciding any case under Article 8 of the Convention. Where a
particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at
stake, the margin allowed to the State will normally be restricted (see Evans, cited above,
§ 77 and the cases cited therein). Where, however, there is no consensus within
the member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative
importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it,
particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the
margin will be wider (see Evans, cited above, § 77; X., Y. and Z.
v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 44; Frette v.
France, no. 36515/97, § 41, ECHR 2002-I; Christine Goodwin v. the United
Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 85, ECHR 2002‑VI; and A. B. and
C. v. Ireland, cited above, § 232). By reason of their
direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the
State authorities are, in principle, in a better position than the
international judge to give an opinion, not only on the “exact content of the
requirements of morals” in their country, but also on the necessity of a
restriction intended to meet them (see A. B. and C. v. Ireland, ibid., with
further references). There will usually be a wide margin of appreciation
accorded if the State is required to strike a balance between competing private
and public interests or Convention rights (see Evans, cited above,
§ 77, and Dickson, cited above, § 78).
95. In
that connection the Court observes that, according to the study
“Medically-assisted Procreation and the Protection of the Human Embryo
Comparative Study on the Situation in 39 States” compiled by the Council of
Europe in 1998 on the basis of replies by the member States of the Council of
Europe to the Steering Committee on Bioethics, ovum donation was expressly
prohibited in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and
Switzerland and sperm donation in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Norway, and
Sweden. At present sperm donation is prohibited, in addition to Austria, in
only three countries: Italy,
Lithuania
and Turkey,
while ovum donation is prohibited in these countries and in Croatia, Germany, Norway and Switzerland.
However, legislation in that field, if it exists at all, varies considerably.
While medically assisted procreation is regulated in detail in some countries,
it is regulated only to a certain extent in others and in some other countries
not at all.
96. The
Court would conclude that there is now a clear trend in the legislation of the
Contracting States towards allowing gamete donation for the purpose of in vitro fertilization,
which reflects an emerging European consensus. That emerging consensus is not,
however, based on settled and long-standing principles established in the law
of the member States but rather reflects a stage of development within a
particularly dynamic field of law and does not decisively narrow the margin of
appreciation of the State.”
In a remarkable turnaround
versus the decision of the Grand Chamber in the above cited case now it is accepted that
limiting the rate of IPR to
protect the embryo is disproportionate and
represents an interference with personal life, as well as limits the
degree of freedom for signatory States
in the regulation of IVF.
The thesis that we hold is that it is a kind of
reconstruction of the Roe American judgment
and The Court ) illegitimately imposes
eugenic practice at European level based
on personal and family life respect
(a right that is built similar to the U.S.
privacy)
Eugenics and human
rights.
Originally eugenics is a science that, really, is presented as a policy linked to social Darwinism.
It appears in this sense in the work of
Francis Galton. The objective is to keep the
struggle for survival in the human
context, in order to prevent the
jump from natural selection
to eliminate the
social advantages thereof. That
is, it is a unique way to keep the supposedly
natural advantages with artificial means.
Eventually it is no more than the old
prejudices regarding the responsibility of the poor disguised with so called
scientific thesis.
The concern of eugenics was always to improve mankind
through the application of science.
This happens both in its
negative aspects (selection by elimination of the defective) as well as in its positive ones (selection of the fittest for reproduction, or when this was made possible, of those who were considered
to have positive features).
Net, we are in the path of the gnostic project, as
it was reported by Voegelin and then commented by Gómez
Dávila (although the latter
was certainly eugenicist).
However, as regards the legal creation the Bogotian
could not be more successful. "The first revolution started when
a fool thought that the Law could be invented" (Escolios a un texto implícito, Atalanta,
510)
The methods of eugenics were first deprived from
reproductive capacity to those who were considered unfit to
hold the panacea eugenics,
the famous society genetic heritage.
This limitation was racially motivated or based on pseudoscientific observations, such as the consideration of the inheritance
of certain moral defects.
Even very respectable courts,
creators of especially relevant Jurisprudence
for individual and social rights protection, as the U.S. Supreme Court,
sentenced in an openly eugenicist way, starring like Oliver Holmes,
as he said in the case Buck v. BELL,
274 U.S. 200 (1927)
274 U.S. 200:
“It is better for the whole
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to
let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. . Three generations of imbeciles are enough. [274 U.S. 200, 208]”
The eugenic point of view was social, for this reason
the second method in countries of
immigration was the selection of immigrants for alleged eugenic
reasons. This resulted, as is known
in clear racist immigration laws,
also at the same time in the United States. Thus
the law signed by President Coolidge
However, the
field of abortion was the field where probably eugenics was more
clearly linked to a more social prejudice-based. Here, the thesis followed a tailored
Malthusianism principle, which considered that higher reproductive propensity from lower classes was
negatively affecting genetic heritage. Spreading abortion among women of this social class was therefore an eugenics
objective per se, hence the support of eugenics movements
to legalize abortion as quoted by Anne Farmer,
in his indispensable book "By Their Fruits.
Eugenics, population control and the abortion campaign".
Interestingly, abortion was restricted to racially
healthy population whatever their social status
in countries where racial prejudice persisted over the social one, and ethnic groups fostered
in "sick", "lower" or "parasites",
by following some of the terminology of the time.
Obviously eugenics rediscovers its "pre-scientific"
roots in infanticide
and euthanasia.
This brief
introduction is intended to recall that eugenics is the foundation of some of the biggest attacks to human rights, attacks that led to the emergence of the Council of Europe Human Right system of
guarantees, through first, the
European Convention and then, the
European Court of Human Rights.
It is in this context that we must analyze the alleged scandal that the European Court
sanctions Itsaly for having limited in the Law 40, the most aggressive eugenic practice
as it is PGD linked to fertilization "in
vitro".
The serious
contradiction in European legislation.
This paradox is particularly acute,
given that the majority of European states, which
belong to both the
European Union and the Council of
Europe, are exposed in the same
year to an embryo protective
jurisprudence, in the famous sentence
Brüstle / Greenpeace
from the of Court of Justice, together with an aggressive jurisprudence on the same topic, in the Costa-Pavan
Judgment Against Italy by the European Court of Human Rights, which
certainly establishes de facto and provisionally compulsory
eugenic option in
assisted reproduction laws.
Hence, it is
impossible to forget the most important data regarding the embryo valuation in the European
Union law.
In this ruling and application of Directive 98/44 EC on the legal
protection of biotechnological inventions, the Court of Justice of
the European Union has had
occasion in Case c-34/10 Oliver Brüstle /
Greenpeace, 18 October 2011
to resolve a matter referred by the German Supreme
Court on the scope of the exclusion from
patentability by the
human body, in all stages of its
formation and development including germinal cells, and the simple
discovery of one its elements or one of its products, including the sequence or partial sequence
of a human gene, are not patentable.
For this purpose the Court defines a “non-patentable embryo concept, common to all European countries. It is a broad concept of embryo, that only for that purpose, differs from the prevailing interpretation in British or Spanish legislation, and comes
closer to the current concept in
German law.
The reasons to
support developing embryo protective legislation are evident in such a forum as this one.
It is worth to remark that this
legislation imposes progressively
at European level and that it is in that progressive phenomenon
that there are some contradictions
to be resolved in the direction of
promoting the embryo protection.
Recently Justo Aznar has stressed the relationship between biological and legal
status of the human embryo. The Foundation of its
human rights, must
be built upon
its biological reality.
The claim that we have to justify is that the
early embryo is a
living human being
of our species, a
human individual, and not a lump of cells without any
biological structure.
Some of the arguments to
support our view are:
1 Genetic identity of
the embryo: The genome of the zygote already contains all the genetic
information necessary for that new being to develop fully until its status as a
living adult being. As Justo Aznar states, the genetic identity of the new
individual and its membership to a particular species has already been
determined in the embryo. The evolution of that being is a continuous
biological process resulting in the different realities of its development,
within the life, until that identifies it as a living human being, from the
fertilisation of the egg by the sperm until its natural death. However there
are many biological arguments to support that a human individual is something
more than its genetic code. We have now a lot more information about
non-genetic mechanisms than significantly influence embryo development. Any
phenotype expression of a living being is the result of the gene content of its
genome and the epigenetic information that is generated throughout its evolution,
as a fundamental consequence of the interaction of the genome with its
environment.
There are other
biological mechanisms which support the position that the early human embryo
cannot be considered as a merely lump of cells, but as an organised living
being: These include:
Mechanisms that regulate
the emission of the embryo development program.
The so-called position
information.
The role placed by a
fusion of the cell membranes of both gametes in starting up the embryo
development process and the determination of the asymmetry and polarity of the
zygote.
Various biochemical
factors, mainly the intra and extracellular calcium levels, which can directly
influence embryo development.
The genetic regulation
of the cell differentiation mechanisms.
The biochemical dialogue
established between the embryo and its mother, during its time in the
Fallopian tube.
Finally the inhibition
of the mother’s immune response.
Implantation diagnosis, prenatal diagnosis and eugenic abortion.
The eugenic route in assisted reproduction laws first appears linked to
preimplantation diagnosis, then
to prenatal diagnosis and finally
the so-called eugenic abortion.
I think it is worth
highlighting some aspects regarding
eugenic abortion that could be useful
when analyzing the Pavan and Coast.
The extent of eugenic indication
in the Eighties developed
in a less obscene period than today’s. In the German
jurisprudence, for example, and
in a way, also in Spanish one,
the goal of selecting the healthy child and the subsequent destruction of the defective one, is concealed under the doctrine of criminal conduct
required there be no other. That is, it is burdensome to impose a
penalty on a person beset to certain
behavior, given the seriousness of the situation to him revealed through prenatal diagnosis. No penalty, but also, no right to abortion. What is more, it seems to
be excluded (in theory) but not
in practice. This was of
particular concern to the German
Constitutional Court: a eugenic policy. In other words, the eugenics exception was not
so much the right to prepare or
access to a child
without flaws but the benefit of
granting no penalty to a behavior on which the
order has a clear
position.
The context of the debate on the legal status of the embryo
Another issue that can’t be
disregarded when analyzing prenatal life protecting legislation is the
inconsistency in which laws are being submerged due to the presence of several
factors whose ignorance can cause harmful effects. Indeed if ignored by courts
complex reality of architecture around life protection the effect could be
partial, noting inconsistencies where only legal developments or increased
protection at points where it has attained a legislative outcome. This problem
is much more important and even more relevant when these international courts
are subsidiary with a performance of state bodies and courts strictly bound by
an international treaty, so that the effectiveness of their performance
statement requires a Committee of Ministers.
Indeed in the legal status of
the embryo various situations might be considered (which could be referred to
as rights in tension)
The first one is how can abortion
not be ignored, when considered as a controversial question about its penalty,
with what were called “indications“ playing in many countries in a certain way,
as in Spain, jeopardizing the value of unborn life and certain options hard or
difficult to handle by the mother. When the solution was to set up deadlines,
as in Italian law, the apparent total lack of protection was justified only
around the issue of abortion, which does not mean that in any case the embryo
becomes unprotected: It is unprotected against this aggressive action from his mother,
justified in several ways.
Another one could be the
sadist abortion, the position of absolute availability, somewhat established in
Roe v Wade, with nuances, which indeed could be interpreted as a total loss of
rights of the individual in a prenatal phase versus the absolute will of his mother
of not have a son, or in a different context to have a children under certain
conditions, or to have a son and not a daughter, and so on.
Contentious elements of the judgment. Hyperactivity court.
As Bernard Nathanson once said,
the U.S. Supreme Court's activism has led to a major conflict, which includes
constitutional aspects, by affecting the power of states in criminal matters
and by developing a maximalist concept of privacy that from sexuality (that is
at least my debatable interpretation) obfuscates the right to life or at least
the consideration of a right to prenatal life. Certainly there is no shortage
of initiatives that claim to solve the problem by defining a legislative
resolution prenatal life frontally against the "prohibition of the
question" that established the Supreme Corut .
But the political problem is
that Roe v vade remedy prevents normal judicial solution through the State
legislative construction and public debate, by establishing a maximalist
solution which is also against the original meaning of the Constitution.
There is nothing closer to
this that the action made by the EHRT. It plays again with the privacy, it builds
again a right that didn’t exist before, it ignores again treaties that are the
reason of being of the court itself, by preventing normal public debate as the
one that occurred in Italy in Act 40.
No one knows who authorized
the EHRT in its provisional decision to skip all the complex debate on Law 40,
playing the creative jurisprudence, and solving the political controversy in a
sense, with the strength of their own convictions and using such absurd
arguments (which we will analyze later on), such as just taking intro consideration
just what is reflected in most European legislation.
But, as it has been rightly
pointed out by some of the intervenient parties, the court has had to override
the basic principle of the exhaustion of his performance of the national body,
which clearly reveals the direction of its activism.
In fact, the couple had not
challenged any Italian court to get their alleged right to protection of the
European Court of Human Rights and the EHRT excuse about lack of internal
action is not convincing, given that the Italian courts had already intervened
in similar issues. In short, the European
Court intervenes, apparently breaking its previous
jurisprudence on restrictions on IVF and not considering the objection of the
Italian Government.
Indeed as stated in its
submissions the European Center for Law and Justice:
“The applicant neither can
claim to have been affected in any Convention right nor have they initiated any
action against the Italian judicial authorities: They just claim they wanted to
have a child after a PID and this wish was denied by the Italian State.
It certainly seems that the protection system of the European Court of Human
Rights concerning national rights as subsidiary versus the national states is
abandoned.”
The inconsistency
between the two Italian rules that allow eugenic abortion but not eugenic
selection of embryos results in a disproportionate suffering in the limitation
according to the law. A disproportion that justifies the "intrusion"
of the court.
As noted by Frank
Cranmer:
“The Court considered
that the applicants’ desire to use medically-assisted procreation to have a
healthy baby was a form of expression of their private and family life that
fell within the scope of Article 8. The fact that the domestic law did not
allow them to do so was an interference with their rights under Article 8 which
was certainly “in accordance with the law” and pursued the
legitimate aims of protecting morals and the rights and freedoms of others.
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